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new treaty amended the existing treaties of the EU by carrying 
out most of the reforms previously proposed in the rejected Euro-
pean Constitution. The Constitution, signed in October 2004 and 
ratified by eighteen Member States, was prevented from enter-
ing into force by its rejection in referenda held in France and 
the Netherlands in May and June 2005 respectively. The result-
ing ratification crisis led to a period of “reflection, clarification 
and discussion,”8 ending only 
when the European summit 
held in Brussels in June 2007 
abandoned the idea of a Euro-
pean Constitution and decided 
to replace it with a new amend-
ing treaty in the manner of pre-
vious treaties (i.e. the Single 
European Act, the Maastricht or 
Nice treaties). 
Unexpectedly, Ireland—
the only Member State to hold a 
referendum—turned its back on 
the Lisbon Treaty and voted it 
down in June 2008. This unex-
pected development prompted 
the vast majority of journal-
ists9 to prejudge the “death” of 
the Lisbon Treaty, followed by 
Václav Klaus, the president of the Czech Republic and the only 
EU leader to state that “the Lisbon project is finished.”10 How-
ever, this pessimism was not shared by other European leaders 
who, following the initial shock, initiated negotiations on how to 
bypass the Irish problem. As a matter of fact, one of the top pri-
orities of President Nicolas Sarkozy for the French Presidency 
of the EU (France took over the six-month rotating presidency 
on July 1, 2008) was to come up with a plan for somehow sal-
vaging the Lisbon Treaty.11 
The European Council met in Brussels on June 19–20, 2008 
and decided to delay any decision until the next summit in Octo-
ber 2008.12 As a result of the unexpected financial meltdown, the 
issue of the treaty was pushed to the sidelines, as Europe’s lead-
ers had far more pressing and urgent concerns to occupy their 
attention during October’s European Council summit. Decisions 
InTroDucTIon
The historic December 2008 European Council meeting in Brussels resulted inter alia in the endorsement by Euro-pean Union (“EU”) leaders of a plan to revive the Lis-
bon Treaty, following the treaty’s rejection by the Irish people 
in June 2008. Both the 2005 European Constitution and its suc-
cessor, the 2007 Lisbon or Reform Treaty,1 are aimed at improv-
ing lingering shortcomings in the 
institutional operation of the EU 
in a number of policy fields.2 To 
this end, the EU’s Member States 
had decided inter alia to appoint 
a full-time European Council 
President,3 promote a clearer and 
fairer voting system in the Coun-
cil of Ministers,4 create a more 
powerful EU High Representa-
tive for Foreign Affairs and,5 
finally, introduce majority voting 
on a number of internal security 
policy areas.6 
This article focuses exclu-
sively on the extent to which this 
new amending treaty will have 
an improving effect on the EU’s 
performance when negotiating 
in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). Authors have been unanimous 
in identifying the rotating Presidency system, the predominance 
of environment ministries in climate change negotiations, and 
the complexity of internal EU coordination, as being the three 
main causes undermining the negotiating performance of the 
EU in international climate talks. Following an analysis of the 
climate-related changes instituted by the Reform Treaty, this 
article concludes that it will not significantly improve the current 
situation, as EU leaders proved largely unwilling to weaken the 
powers of the Member States vis-à-vis the Community in that 
particular policy area.7
backgrounD
On December 13, 2007, the heads of government and state 
of the EU Member States signed the Treaty of Lisbon (also 
known as the Reform Treaty) at a summit in Lisbon, Portugal. 
Expected at the time to enter into force sometime in 2009, this 
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were postponed for the next Council meeting in December 2008, 
where European governments eventually approved a package of 
concessions to Ireland, aiming at addressing the concerns about 
sovereignty that led Irish voters to reject the Lisbon Treaty.13 It 
is of interest to note that the EU Presidency had, from the very 
outset, the firmly expressed commitment of the Irish govern-
ment to producing a plan that would facilitate a “Yes” vote in 
a future second referendum.14 These concessions were offered 
with the proviso that Ireland would ratify the Lisbon Treaty by 
October 2009. Of course, it remains to be seen whether these 
measures will be enough to convince the Irish people to endorse 
the Lisbon Treaty a second time around. In any case, at the time 
of writing, the Lisbon Treaty is far from dead and may soon be a 
reality in the lives of European citizens. It would therefore be of 
usefulness to academics, policy-makers, and all interested par-
ties to be aware in advance of what this treaty actually entails 
for Europe.
The main objectives of both the European Constitution and 
the Reform Treaty that replaced it were inter alia to establish 
simpler and clearer rules for decision-making in a continuously 
enlarging EU of (currently) twenty-seven Member States and to 
“ensure that the EU’s institutions operate in a more effective and 
efficient manner.”15 The present study focuses only on one par-
ticular policy area, investigating specifically the extent to which 
the new Reform Treaty will ensure a more effective and effi-
cient operation of the EU when negotiating in the context of the 
UNFCCC. The relevant EU climate policy literature has long 
ago identified a number of problematic features in the EU’s cli-
mate decision-making machinery and has offered possible rem-
edies. Groundbreaking as they were, European leaders proved 
unwilling to incorporate the bulk of these remedies in the 2007 
Lisbon Treaty.
crITIcIsms oF The currenT  
InsTITuTIonal seT-up
Unlike other areas, such as trade, water quality, or hazard-
ous waste disposal, where competence16 lies with the Commu-
nity, climate change is an area in which a situation of “shared 
competence” pertains. In international climate change negotia-
tions, therefore, common EU positions have been agreed upon 
in advance “by the Member States, with the participation of the 
Commission. The country holding the Presidency of the EU—a 
position that rotates every six months—coordinates the members 
and presents the EU position at the international negotiations.”17 
In other words, the Presidency, assisted by the previous and next 
Member State to hold that position (the “troika”), has assumed 
the leadership role.
There exist a number of problems that result from the EU’s 
current institutional set-up, which involves too many actors in 
the whole climate change negotiation process (currently the 
 twenty-seven Member States plus the Commission). The first 
problem is the system of the half-yearly rotating presidency. 
Authors argue/criticize that not only does it not allow for conti-
nuity in the EU’s negotiating strategy and the formulation of a 
long-term strategic perspective, but that it also results in a loss 
of “institutional memory.”18 As Van Schaik and Egenhofer note, 
“since the Presidency is changing every half year, there is a rela-
tively high chance of inconsistencies in performance and actual 
positions. This semi-annual change in leadership can also be 
a constraining factor regarding the formulation of a long-term 
strategic perspective.”19
A second complication confronting the EU during the 
course of international climate change negotiations is known 
as the “EU Bunker.” Changing positions and agreeing on new 
proposals by other international actors requires the assent of 
the majority of Member States. This, however, is very difficult 
to achieve during the course of the negotiations and it can be 
a “major source of delay and frustration, with endless co-ordi-
nation meetings and the inflexibility of Council Mandates.”20 
Investing much (precious) time in bridging internal differences 
may also result in EU Member States being practically unable 
to react to outside developments. Creatively put, the amount of 
time and diplomatic effort that is required for these intra-bloc 
negotiations often means that the EU is conducting “a confer-
ence within a conference.”21 
It is well known, for example, that in the final dramatic 
night at Kyoto the EU ministers “were still locked in inter-
nal consultations while the plenary was in session: Chairman 
Estrada gavelled through the critical text on the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (“CDM”) while EU ministers were still trying 
to establish a common position in another room.”22 When they 
informed the Chairman of their opposition to the pre-budget 
crediting of emission reductions, the decision had already been 
made and could not be reopened.23 The same situation recurred 
during the sixth Conference of Parties (“COP”) at The Hague in 
2000, when EU ministers were still debating amendments they 
wished to propose to Chairman Pronk’s compromise paper after 
amendments from all the other groups, even the much larger and 
under-resourced Group of 77 (underdeveloped countries) plus 
China (“G-77/China”), had been circulated and the final night’s 
crucial negotiations had begun.24
Finally, a third problem relates to the predominance of 
environment ministries and the under-representation of econom-
ics and trade ministries in climate change negotiations. Several 
authors agree that climate talks have somewhat “outgrown” 
the environmental ministries, as they involve not only environ-
mental but also—and increasingly so—economic, trade, devel-
opment, energy, and transport issues and concerns.25 It is thus 
felt that closer cooperation between the environment, trade, and 
economic ministries “would do more justice to the economic 
realities of climate change policy.”26 In the United States, for 
example, it is the State Department that takes the lead in the 
negotiations, with the Department of Commerce being respon-
sible for the overall coordination of the U.S. position.27 Fol-
lowing the flawed performance of the EU at The Hague COP in 
2000, the EU did try to address this issue by allowing for greater 
flexibility in the common position, strengthening the role of the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (“COREPER”), and 
having economic, trade, and foreign ministries more involved 
in the whole process.28 These changes did lead to improvements 
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in the performance of the EU in COP-6bis (Bonn) and COP-7 
(Marrakech), but did not “fundamentally alter the way the EU 
position [was] formulated.”29 
suggesTIons For ImprovemenT
Commentators over the years have made a number of pro-
posals aiming at improving the EU’s operational functioning. It 
has been widely suggested, for instance, that the performance 
of the EU would improve dramatically if the Member States 
allowed the European Commission to take over the coordina-
tion of the EU negotiating position from the Presidency.30 This, 
however, is a highly unlikely future prospect, as several Mem-
ber States (i.e. the UK) are vehemently opposed to any further 
expansion of the competencies of the Commission.31 As we 
shall see, such a prospect becomes even slimmer now with the 
new Reform Treaty.
Another proposal, by Lacasta et al., involves delegating 
authority to a number of “lead countries” that would prepare, 
in close cooperation with the 
Commission, “draft common 
negotiating positions to be 
decided by the Council.”32 
Grubb and Gupta share this 
proposal, noting in turn that 
such a move would “reflect 
the nature of the EU as a 
strong intergovernmental 
rather than supranational 
institution.”33 These “lead 
countries”—or the Commis-
sion in the first case—would 
also be responsible for the 
formulation beforehand of 
commonly agreed “fall-
back” positions that would 
allow for greater EU flex-
ibility in the decisive phases 
of UNFCCC talks.34 Cur-
rently, the inflexibility of the 
Council mandates results in 
the EU having neither such fall-backs nor the necessary mecha-
nisms for coming up with them in the midst of the negotiations.35 
However, given the political and economic implications of cli-
mate change, the extent to which some Member States would be 
willing to allow for decisions to be taken for them without their 
express approval and input is subject to debate. 
Finally, regarding the issue of the predominance of environ-
ment ministries, a possible suggestion by some authors provides 
for climate policy to become part of the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (“CFSP”), thereby bringing “diplomatic 
muscle (and, hopefully, finesse) to the Community actions.”36 
Similar is one of many proposals by Van Schaik and Egen-
hofer, who propose that the Foreign Affairs Council would be 
responsible for the formulation of climate policy, thus “offering 
a possibility for more integration of the EU’s position in climate 
negotiations with other external policies of the EU.”37 In this 
case, Environment Ministers, whose expertise is deemed essen-
tial, could second their Foreign Ministers during sessions of the 
Foreign Affairs Council in which external climate policy nego-
tiating positions are debated.38 Another option in this regard 
would be for Foreign and Environment Ministers to hold joint 
meetings, for instance every half a year.39
changes InsTITuTeD by The  
reForm TreaTy
Before attempting to explain the benefits the Reform Treaty 
will have for the EU’s performance in UNFCCC negotiations, 
a symbolic comment should be made. The new treaty, in the 
amended Article 174, states that one of the aims of EU envi-
ronmental policy will be to promote “measures at [the] interna-
tional level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental 
problems, and in particular combating climate change.”40 It is 
the first time the term “climate change” appears in the text of an 
EU treaty. Provided that it 
enters into force, the Reform 
Treaty will introduce, as 
already discussed, a num-
ber of institutional changes 
meant to improve the effi-
cient running of the EU. 
How then, would this new 
treaty strengthen EU perfor-
mance in international cli-
mate change negotiations?
To begin with, the 
European Parliament (“EP”) 
will be able to veto interna-
tional agreements, including 
climate change-related ones. 
Until now, the Council only 
consulted the EP and could 
ignore its judgement if act-
ing unanimously. Pursuant 
to the Reform Treaty, the 
consent of the EP (as the 
“voice of the people”) would be required for the ratification of 
international environmental (including climate) agreements, 
enhancing therefore the democratic legitimacy of the EU.41 The 
EP might never actually vote down an international environmen-
tal agreement, but it may become more demanding and insist 
that its viewpoints on climate change issues be taken more seri-
ously into consideration.42 
Continuing on with the Presidency, the rotating system will 
remain largely the same. Even though the European Council 
will have its own President (in office for two and a half years), 
the chairmanship of the other councils, except foreign affairs, 
will continue to rotate every six months. The efficiency of the 
Presidency, however, is expected to improve significantly with 
the introduction—already in operation since 2007—of a new 
enhanced “troika-like” system, known as the “triple presidency.” 
It has been widely suggested 
. . . that the performance 
of the EU would improve 
dramatically if the Member 
States allowed the European 
Commission to take over 
the coordination of the EU 
negotiating position from  
the Presidency.
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According to the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
which never came into force, the Presidency would continue to 
rotate every six months, but every eighteen months the three 
Presidencies due to hold office would negotiate a common 
agenda and work together over this one and half year period 
to accomplish its objectives, always led by the Member State 
 holding the presidency at the time. Even though the aforemen-
tioned treaty is not legally binding, the September 2006 Council 
of the European Union decided to adopt the concept of the pre-
siding trio.43 
This development will allow for greater coordination and 
continuity, as it will put an end to the practice exercised up to 
2006 of every successive Presidency re-writing the agenda every 
six months in accordance with its own priorities. In the context of 
climate politics, the new “troika-like” system will enable Mem-
ber States with a greater interest in this policy area to relieve 
smaller ones of the burden of conducting negotiations in which 
they have no actual interest. As is obvious, not all Member States 
are usually active in a particular 
policy area. In most Multilat-
eral Environmental Agreements 
(“MEAs”), less than half a dozen 
positions are likely to emerge, 
as most small Member States do 
not have a particular line to push. 
Luxemburg, for example, cannot 
employ more than a handful of 
its officials to specialize in any 
MEA when it holds the presiden-
cy.44 To give another example, 
the Presidency during 1996—one 
year prior to Kyoto’s crucial 
COP-3—had been held by Italy 
and Ireland, two countries known 
for their lack of a progressive stance on climate change. The 
position of the EU had remained practically unchanged since 
Berlin’s 1995 COP-1, and it would not have been a hyperbole 
to suggest that it had virtually stagnated.45 It is for cases such as 
this that the Reform Treaty’s new presiding Trio concept could 
prove a far more workable system. Of course, as promising as it 
may seem, only time will demonstrate the extent to which this 
new arrangement will indeed be an improvement.
A final related innovation is, as already mentioned, the 
establishment by the Reform Treaty of an EU Minister for For-
eign Affairs (the High Representative for Foreign Policy and 
Security)—merging the existing roles of High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner 
for External Affairs. The role, if any, of the High Representative 
for Foreign Policy and Security in international climate change 
negotiations is as yet unclear.46 According to Van Schaik and 
Egenhofer, involvement of the Foreign Minister in EU activities 
in the UNFCCC could “advance the integration of climate change 
with other policy areas, notably with other external policies.”47 
Such involvement, however, even if it does occur, will likely 
remain limited or auxiliary, as only officials of environment 
ministries command the immensely specialized knowledge on 
technical aspects of the climate change policy area.48 Given 
that the EU “Foreign Minister” will be mainly responsible for 
the EU’s CFSP, Environment Ministers will in all probability 
remain largely responsible for the formulation of the EU’s posi-
tion on climate change, aided on occasion by their economic, 
trade, and foreign counterparts. In other words, the current sys-
tem is not expected to be altered significantly. 
conclusIon
To conclude, despite the explicit acknowledgement of cli-
mate change in the Reform Treaty, actual climate-related changes 
in the Treaty are limited. National governments prove to be ada-
mant in their insistence to maintain control over their energy 
policy, a key element of national security in the view of many 
sovereigns. When it comes to energy, major disparities exist 
within, between, and among the nations of the EU. Given their 
vast differences in economic development, these twenty-seven 
Member States have, in most 
cases, widely different energy 
matrices, greenhouse gas emis-
sion, and energy consumption 
patterns. Internal EU negotia-
tions for agreeing a common cli-
mate policy, therefore, are quite 
strenuous and time-consuming, 
as different Member States are 
more willing and/or capable 
to reduce their emissions than 
others.49 Closely related to this 
is the Euro-scepticism of some 
Member States (e.g. the United 
Kingdom) who are unwilling to 
expand the competencies and 
reach of the EU’s governing bodies. The Commission’s 1990s 
proposal for an energy/carbon tax serving in this case as a prom-
inent example.50 
The extent, therefore, to which the new treaty would benefit 
the performance of the EU in UNFCCC negotiations is likely 
narrow. Contrary to expectations, the Reform Treaty does not 
sufficiently address any of the three problems affecting the nego-
tiating ability of the EU tentatively outlined earlier. The “EU 
bunker” will continue to afflict the EU, as will most of the prob-
lems associated with the predominance of environment minis-
tries. The same largely applies to the rotating Presidency, but in 
this case the new enhanced “troika-like” system will definitely 
result in some meaningful improvements in the current situation. 
Undoubtedly, the big question remains whether the new EU For-
eign Minister will become involved in EU climate activities and 
what will be his/her exact role. As seen, such an involvement—in 
all probability one of limited importance—can only benefit the 
EU. In any case, such a discussion is highly hypothetical and the 
questions posed will only be answered following the potential 
entry into force of the Reform Treaty in 2009 or 2010. Several 
authors have advocated a reform of EU institutions as the only 
The extent . . . to which  
the new treaty would 
benefit the performance  
of the EU in  
UNFCCC negotiations  
is likely narrow.
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practical solution for dealing with the current shortcomings of 
the EU as a negotiator in policy areas of “shared competence.” 
Unfortunately, such a reform of institutions—as far as climate 
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change policy is concerned—was not carried out by the Reform 
Treaty, as it presented a choice not politically acceptable to the 
majority of EU Member States.
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